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BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROFESSORS AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
The National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) is a nonprofit voluntary
professional bar association that works on behalf of
criminal defense attorneys to ensure justice and due
process for those accused of crime or misconduct.
NACDL was founded in 1958. It has a nationwide
membership of many thousands of direct members,
and up to 40,000 with affiliates. NACDL’s members
include private criminal defense lawyers, public
defenders, military defense counsel, law professors,
and judges. NACDL is the only nationwide
professional bar association for public defenders and
private criminal defense lawyers. NACDL is
dedicated to advancing the proper, efficient, and just
administration of justice. NACDL files numerous
amicus briefs each year in the U.S. Supreme Court
and other federal and state courts, seeking to
provide amicus assistance in cases that present
issues of broad importance to criminal defendants,

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and both
of their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Under
Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amicus states that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
other than amicus or its counsel made a monetary contribution
to its preparation or submission.
1
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criminal defense lawyers, and the criminal justice
system as a whole.
NACDL is keenly interested in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the
context of the scope of exceptions to the warrant
requirement, and the prospect of authority for
ostensibly non-criminal investigative searches
serving as a tool for evading the warrant
requirement for criminal investigations.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT
______
In Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542,
553 (7th Cir. 2014), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the
distinctions among the exigent circumstances
doctrine, the emergency aid doctrine, and the
community caretaking doctrine “are not always
clear.” In turn, these fuzzy distinctions have led to a
“lack of clarity in judicial articulation and
application of the three doctrines.” Id. at 553 n.5.
This lack of clarity means that courts deciding
whether the community caretaking doctrine should
apply to warrantless home entries often think that
doctrine is needed to justify entries that are already
covered by the exigent circumstances doctrine and/or
the emergency aid doctrine.
As set forth in this amici brief, this Court’s
opinions defining and applying the exigent
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines establish
that police officers would need to rely on the
community caretaking doctrine as an independent
justification for warrantless home entries in only two
potential situations: to address (1) non-bodily harms
such as nuisances; and (2) non-imminent threats of
bodily harm.
Framed in that fashion, it is clear that a
separate and independent rationale such as
“community caretaking” – which was generated by
the special circumstances attendant to automobile
searches – does not justify invasion of the sanctity of
the home. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 455 (1971) (“The exceptions [to the warrant
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requirement] are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and
there must be ‘a showing by those who seek
exemption * * * that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative.’”).
Indeed, the way that this Court distinguished its
opinion in Coolidge in creating the community
caretaking doctrine makes clear that the doctrine
does not and should not apply to warrantless home
entries. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 44748 (1973). In addition, the capacity for a “community
caretaking” exception that permits warrantless
searches of the home would invite its use as an endrun around the protections of the warrant
requirement.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Scope of the Exigent Circumstances
Doctrine

This Court defined the exigent circumstances
doctrine in its seminal case, Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499 (1978). In Tyler, public officials made three
significant warrantless entries into a furniture store:
(1) a first entry to fight a fire; (2) a second entry four
hours after the fire was extinguished to determine
the fire’s origin; and (3) a third entry weeks after the
fire to take photos. Id. at 501-03.
In finding that the first two warrantless entries
were Constitutional, the Tyler Court held that “[o]ur
decisions have recognized that a warrantless entry
by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal
when there is compelling need for official action and
no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 509. The Tyler
Court then held that “[a] burning building clearly
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presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to
render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 509.
Moreover, the Court concluded that “officials need no
warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable
time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has
been extinguished.” Id. at 510. Therefore, because
the second entry was “no more than an actual
continuation of the first,” it was Constitutional as
well. Id. at 511.
Conversely, the third entry weeks after the fire
was unconstitutional because it was “clearly
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless
entry.” Id. According to the Tyler Court, at that
point, additional entries could only be made (1)
“pursuant to the warrant procedures governing
administrative searches;” or (2) pursuant to a search
warrant “upon a traditional showing of probable
cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.”
Id.
Since Tyler, this Court has recognized other
situations in which this exigent circumstances
doctrine allows for warrantless home entries due to
the “‘compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant.’” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.
141, 149 (2013) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509).
These situations include the hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,
42-43 (1976), and preventing the imminent
destruction of evidence, see Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 470 (2011).
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II. The Scope of the Emergency Aid
Doctrine
This Court recognized the emergency aid
doctrine in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398 (2006). In Stuart, police officers responded to a
call regarding loud music at a residence and,
through a screen door and windows, saw four adults
trying to restrain a juvenile. Id. at 400-01. The
juvenile then broke free and punched one of the
adults, who subsequently spit blood into a sink. Id.
at 401. The officers then entered the residence. Id. In
finding the entry was Constitutional under the
emergency aid doctrine, the Stuart Court held that
“law enforcement officers may enter a home without
a warrant to render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.” Id. at 403.
In Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009), this
Court subsequently clarified the emergency aid
doctrine. In Fisher, police officers responding to a
complaint of a disturbance were directed by a couple
“to a residence where a man was ‘going crazy.’” Id. at
45. Upon arrival at the house, the officers saw “a
pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed,
damaged fenceposts along the side of the property,
and three broken house windows, the glass still on
the ground outside.” Id. at 45-46. They also saw
blood on one of the doors of the house as well as
blood on the hood of the pickup truck and on clothes
inside of it. Id. at 46. The back door to the house was
locked, and the officers could see a couch blocking
the front door. Id. They could also see Jeremy Fisher
screaming and throwing things inside the house. Id.
When the officers knocked on the front door, Fisher
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refused to answer. Id. The officers could see that
Fisher had a cut on his hand and “asked him
whether he needed medical attention.” Id. When
Fisher ignored this question and profanely told the
officers to get a search warrant, the officers entered
the house. Id.
In finding that the entry was Constitutional
under the emergency aid doctrine, the Fisher Court
disagreed with the Court of Appeals of Michigan. Id.
at 48. The Court of Appeals had held that the
emergency aid doctrine did not apply because
“[a]lthough there was evidence that there was an
injured person on the premises, the mere drops of
blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening
injury.” People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL
786515, at *2 (Mich. App., March 25, 2008)
Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed that the cut
on Fisher’s hand “likely explained the trail of blood”
and that Fisher “was very much on his feet and
apparently able to see to his own needs.” Id.
The Fisher Court, however, found that “[e]ven a
casual review of Brigham City reveals the flaw in
this reasoning.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. According to
the Court, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a
likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the
emergency aid exception.” Id. As support, the Fisher
Court noted that “[t]he only injury police could
confirm in Brigham City was the bloody lip they saw
the juvenile inflict upon the adult.” Id. Moreover, the
Court rejected Fisher’s argument that the officers
lacked a subjective belief that he needed assistance
because they did not summon emergency medical
personnel. Id. Instead, the Fisher Court found that
the test was “whether there was ‘an objectively
reasonable basis for believing’ that medical
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assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.”
Id.
Fisher helps to explain cases in which the
emergency aid doctrine applies but the traditional
exigent circumstances framework might not. This
Court has held that the exigent circumstances
doctrine allows for warrantless home entries due to
the “‘compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant.’” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149
(2013) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). Meanwhile,
for the emergency aid doctrine to apply, public
officials need “‘an objectively reasonable basis for
believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or
persons were in danger.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49.
In Fisher, despite Fisher telling the officers to
return with a warrant, it is questionable whether
those officers had probable cause to obtain either a
search or arrest warrant. But, unlike the exigent
circumstances doctrine as a whole, the emergency
aid doctrine – a subset thereof – is not premised on
expediting an entry rather than waiting to secure a
warrant. Instead, because there was an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that Fisher needed
medical assistance and/or was in danger, the officers
could enter, regardless of whether and when they
could secure a warrant. Moreover, as the Stuart
Court noted, the emergency aid doctrine also allows
for warrantless entries “to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.” Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403.
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III. The Scope of a Possible Community
Caretaking Doctrine for Warrantless
Home Entries
This Court recognized the community caretaking
doctrine in the automobile context in Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973), holding that
a warrant is not required when police officers are
reasonably performing “community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute.” While this Court
has never explicitly addressed when or if this
doctrine applies to warrantless home entries, the
preceding descriptions of the scope of the exigent
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines help
bring into focus the question currently before the
Court.
Simply put, given the existence of the exigent
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines, both of
which allow for warrantless home entries, reliance
on – and any need for – the community caretaking
doctrine as authority for warrantless home entry
would apply in only two situations: (1) non-bodily
harms such as nuisances; and (2) non-imminent
threats of bodily harm. In any other situation
conceivably triggering the community caretaking
doctrine, police officers can already rely upon the
exigent circumstances doctrine and/or the emergency
aid doctrine.
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A. Non-Bodily Harms Such as
Nuisances
Some courts have applied the community
caretaking doctrine to warrantless home entries in
cases involving dangers that they acknowledge are
not as serious as the threat of bodily harm covered
by the emergency aid doctrine or the compelling
needs covered by the exigent circumstances doctrine.
Many of these cases involve nuisances. For example,
in United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th
Cir. 1996), police officers made a warrantless entry
into a house after receiving a loud noise complaint
from a neighbor. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit initially noted that “the ‘danger’
here, loud music, does not rise to the level of the
dangers recognized in prior cases” involving the
exigent circumstances and emergency aid doctrines.
Id. at 1519.
The court then held, though, that “although the
Warrant Clause certainly is not irrelevant to the
governmental intrusion at issue here, that clause
nevertheless is implicated to a lesser degree when
police officers act in their roles as ‘community
caretakers.’” Id. at 1523. Specifically, “[b]ecause
the...officers were not engaged in the ‘often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’...there
is less cause for concern that they might have rashly
made an improper decision.” Id. The court also found
it untenable “to insist that, despite their community
caretaking role, the officers must have established
‘probable cause,’ as that term is used in the context
of criminal investigations, before they could enter
Defendant’s home.” Id. Therefore, having found that
the officers’ home entry was motivated by a
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community caretaking interest, the Sixth Circuit
found “that their failure to obtain a warrant does not
render that entry unlawful.” Id.
Other courts similarly have applied the
community caretaking doctrine to warrantless home
entries
based
on
noise
complaints
while
acknowledging the lesser risk of harm in such cases.
See, e.g., Olson v. State, 56 A.3d 576, 606 (Md. App.
2012) (applying the community caretaking exception
to a complaint regarding noise that did not endanger
the lives of neighbors but instead endangered “the
peace and good order of the community”); Bies v.
State, 251 N.W.2d 461, 471 (Wis. 1977) (applying the
community caretaking doctrine to a noise complaint
while acknowledging that “[i]t is apparent that the
information the officer had could justify little police
intrusion upon the privacy of a citizen”).
B. Non-Imminent Threats of Bodily
Harm
This case involves the second situation in which
police officers would need to seek to rely on the
community caretaking doctrine to justify a
warrantless home entry: to address non-imminent
threats of bodily harm. Courts have reached
different conclusions on the question of whether the
community caretaking doctrine applies in this
situation while framing the issue in similar ways.
In Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d
1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2016), police officers were
dispatched to the defendant’s house after being given
information about an attempted suicide by a subject
who “was possibly armed with a shotgun.”
Eventually, the defendant voluntarily left his home,
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closing and locking the front door behind him. Id. at
1027. The defendant surrendered himself into the
officers’ custody and admitted himself to a Veterans
Hospital for PTSD symptoms but did not consent to
a search of his home. Id. Nevertheless, police officers
completed two warrantless entries into his home and
seized weapons, including firearms. Id. In finding
that neither the community caretaking doctrine nor
any warrant exception applied, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that there was no objectively reasonable factual
basis to believe there was an imminent threat of
bodily harm. Id. at 1031.
Conversely, other courts have applied the
community
caretaking
doctrine
in
similar
warrantless home entry cases based on nonimminent threats of bodily harm. In Mora v. City of
Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2008), the
defendant made a 911 call, saying he was suicidal
and had weapons in his apartment. After officers
arrived and drove the defendant to a hospital to see
a psychiatrist, there was a warrantless entry into
the defendant’s apartment and the seizure of
firearms. Id. In finding this entry justified under the
community caretaking doctrine, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the officers dissipated the
emergency by taking the defendant to the hospital.
Id. at 228. But, despite the lack of an imminent
threat of bodily harm, the court still authorized the
warrantless entry because, inter alia, the police had
no way of knowing whether the defendant “might
return to the apartment more quickly than expected
and carry out some desperate plan.” Id.
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Similarly in Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930
F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2019), the defendant
mentioned “‘[s]hooting up schools’ and that he had a
‘gun safe full of guns’” during a welfare check. After
officers detained the defendant and placed him in an
ambulance to travel to a hospital for a psychological
evaluation, there was a warrantless entry into his
house, uncovering firearms. Id. at 1128. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied
the community caretaking doctrine despite the lack
of an imminent threat of bodily harm because the
defendant “might have had access to a firearm in the
near future...should he return from the hospital.” Id.
at 1140.
Finally, in the present case, there was a
warrantless entry into the defendant’s house that
uncovered firearms after he was transported to a
hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Caniglia v.
Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2020). The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
applied the community caretaking doctrine, finding
an “imminent” or “immediate” threat of bodily harm
because the defendant could have accessed the
firearms after he returned from the hospital. Id. at
131-33. But, the court added two caveats: “First, the
terms ‘imminent’ and ‘immediate,’ as used
throughout this opinion, are not imbued with any
definite temporal dimensions.” Id. 126. Second, the
court noted: “Nor is our use of these terms meant to
suggest that the degree of immediacy typically
required under the exigent circumstances and
emergency aid exceptions is always required in the
community caretaking context.” Id. As support for
this second caveat, the court cited Sutterfield for the
proposition that “‘[t]he community caretaking
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doctrine has a more expansive temporal reach’ than
the emergency aid exception.” Id. (quoting
Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 561). In other words, while
the First Circuit facially stated that the threat in
Caniglia was imminent and immediate, its caveats
make clear that the court was actually addressing a
non-imminent threat of future bodily harm.
IV. The Community Caretaking Doctrine
Should Not be Extended From Vehicles
to Homes
Both the exigent circumstances doctrine and the
emergency aid doctrines justify warrantless entries
based upon imminent threats. Specifically, the
exigent circumstances doctrine allows police officers
to address imminent, “emergency conditions” such as
fires, fleeing suspects, and the “imminent
destruction of evidence” without needing to wait for
a warrant. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. Meanwhile, the
emergency aid doctrine allows warrantless entries so
that police officers can “render emergency assistance
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.” Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403. In Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48, this Court
similarly created the community caretaking doctrine
based
on
“immediate
and
constitutionally
reasonable” concerns about safety that can be
connected to vehicles that are not adjacent to
dwellings.
Notably, in creating this doctrine, and in
distinguishing this Court’s opinion in Coolidge, this
Court effectively explained both why the community
caretaking doctrine cannot apply to warrantless
home entries in general and the specific entry in this
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case. In Coolidge, after police officers collected seven
firearms from Edward Coolidge’s house, they
arrested him on suspicion that he had murdered a
fourteen year-old girl. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 445-47.
Subsequently, pursuant to a search warrant for
objects used in the murder, the officers impounded
Coolidge’s car that was parked in his driveway and
searched it, finding particles of gun powder. Id. at
447-48.
But, because the warrant was not issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate, this Court had to
decide whether the search was Constitutional
despite the lack of a lawful warrant. Id. at 449-53.
The Coolidge Court then found that the search was
unconstitutional because, inter alia, the car “was
regularly parked in the driveway of [Coolidge’s]
house” and there was “no suggestion that, on the
night in question, the car was being used for any
illegal purpose.” Id. at 460.
Subsequently in Cady, 413 U.S. at 446-47, this
Court explicitly distinguished Coolidge to create the
community caretaking doctrine. In Cady, police
officers towed a Ford Thunderbird that was disabled
in a car accident, and a warrantless search of the
vehicle uncovered bloodied items. Id. at 436-38. In
creating the community caretaking doctrine, the
Cady Court distinguished Coolidge because “[t]he
Thunderbird was not parked adjacent to the
dwelling place of the owner as in Coolidge..., nor
simply momentarily unoccupied on a street.” Id. at
446-47. Rather, because the Thunderbird was “was
neither in the custody nor on the premises of its
owner,”
there
was
an
“immediate
and
constitutionally reasonable...concern for the safety of
the general public who might be endangered if an
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intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the
vehicle.” Id. at 447-48.
The Cady Court therefore found that a car in a
public space can present imminent threats that a car
in a driveway cannot. The lack of a similar imminent
threat in a car parked in a defendant’s driveway
thus explains why the search of the car in Coolidge
was unconstitutional. Moreover, this absence of an
imminent threat would explain why courts have
found that warrantless searches of cars parked in
driveways are not covered by the community
caretaking doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 236
P.3d 834, 838-41 (Or. App. 2010) (citing Coolidge to
find that the community caretaking doctrine did not
apply to a vehicle parked in the defendant’s
driveway); see also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429
F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (“But no such public
safety concern is implicated by the facts of this case
involving a vehicle parked in the driveway of an
owner who has a valid license.”); Gombert v. Lynch,
541 F.Supp.2d 492, 500 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding the
warrantless search of the defendant’s car parked in
his driveway was unconstitutional because the court
could “find no law...to support the proposition that,
under the banner of ‘community caretaking,’ the
police can search and seize items from a vehicle that
was not itself already under police custody or control
via the police’s community caretaking function”).
Given that in Cady this Court acknowledged its
prior recognition that a person’s privacy interest is
less substantial in her vehicle than in her home, see
Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, there is even less justification
for applying the community caretaking doctrine to
warrantless home searches than there is for
applying it to vehicles parked next to homes. In the
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words of the Coolidge Court, the dangers that the
community caretaking doctrine would cover in
connection with warrantless home searches are not
imperative enough to add it to the “jealously and
carefully drawn” exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.
Finally, there are strong public policy reasons to
avoid extending the community caretaking doctrine
to warrantless home entries. Courts have recognized
the heightened risk that police officers might use the
community caretaking doctrine as pretext or
subterfuge to search vehicles for contraband or other
illegal activity. See, e.g., State v. Rinehart, 617
N.W.2d
842,
844
(S.D.
2000)
(quoting
Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va.
App. 1995) (“We recognize that ‘[t]he ‘community
caretaking’ exception should be cautiously and
narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that
it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting
an investigatory search for criminal evidence.’”);
State v. Maddox, 54 P.3d 464, 469 (Idaho App. 2002)
(“Allowing officers to conduct community caretaking
stops whenever they anticipate that a citizen might
be about to embark upon an unwise venture would
present far too great an opportunity for pretextual
stops and far too great an imposition on the privacy
interests of our citizenry to comport with the Fourth
Amendment.”).
Moreover, courts have begun to realize that this
risk intensifies with warrantless home entries. In
People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999) (quoting
3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed.1996) § 6.6(b),
p. 402)), the Supreme Court of California upheld
application of the community caretaking doctrine to
a warrantless home entry to check the well-being of
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the homeowner while acknowledging that “‘courts
must be especially vigilant in guarding against
subterfuge, that is, a false reliance upon the
[personal safety or] property protection rationale
when the real purpose was to seek out evidence of
crime.’” Subsequently, twenty years later, the same
court found that this risk of subterfuge was too great
and thus concluded that “the community caretaking
exception asserted in the absence of exigency is not
one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the
residential warrant requirement.” People v. Oviedo,
446 P.3d 262, 271-76 (Cal. 2019).
Indeed, in terms of the two types of situations
identified in this brief, there should be concern that
“a police officer may use the false pretext of a
community caretaking ‘welfare check’ or loud music
as pretexts for investigation of suspected drug
trafficking or possession of illegal firearms.” Mark
Goreczny, Note, Taking Care While Doing Right by
the Fourth Amendment: A Pragmatic Approach to the
Community Caretaker Exception, 14 Cardozo Pub. L.
Pol’y & Ethics J. 229, 253-54 (2015).
Furthermore, an expansion of the community
caretaking doctrine would create incentives for law
enforcement to use it to engage in warrantless,
purportedly non-criminal searches and seizures that
were simply stalking horses for criminal
investigations
that
lacked
probable
cause.
Consequently, if the community caretaking doctrine
is extended to warrantless home entries, the “public
perception of the police may shift dramatically from
expecting them to engage in genuine community
caretaking activities, to suspicion of police as using
community caretaking as a pretext to investigate
crimes.” Id. at 254.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
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